Mathew Yglesias summarizes his argument:
In particular, he argues that you can't say that specific elements of "Arab culture" account for the deficit because it's present in non-Arab countries as well. But you also can't say that specific elements of "Muslim culture" account for the deficit because it's not present in Muslim-majority countries that weren't part of the original Arab conquest:
And I think he's mostly right, but he puts too many countries in the wrong category. Turkey was not conquered by Arab armies, but by Turks. Pakistan was briefly conquered by Arab armies, but then spent most of its history under non-Arab dynasties.
I suspect the variable he's seeking is not "conquered by Arab armies" but "spent over 500 years ruled by a Caliphate dynasty". Which does seem to correlate better with a 21st century democracy deficit.
9 comments:
How different is 500 years of (often theoretical ) rule by Caliphs different from centuries of rule by the Most Christian King, the Most Catholic King, or the Holy Roman Emperor?
The Christian monarchs and the Pope were different people, and often acted as checks on the other's power.
The other key difference was the degree to which the Caliphate dynasties relied on slave soldiers.
The actual power of a Caliph in local communities was far less than his theoretical claims. My feeling is that what happened in various parts of the world after 1800 is more important.
Steve, what do you see as the most important post-1800 contributors to democracy deficits?
Here's one: The upswing in the ability of certain European powers to intervene forcefully in the politics of India, China and the Middle East, short-circuiting developments that might have promoted democratic progress. The US in the second half of the 20th century sometimes has played that role.
An example of a country where democratic possibilities have been derailed at least twice by outsiders(Britain, Russia, and the USA) is Iran. Democratic developments in the Ottoman Empire/Turkey happened despite external opposition.
There are of course internal factors in these cases and others.
I was not impressed by that economist's study that rated the democratic deficit in relation to one point, now. Germany, for instance, is doing all right now, but the extent of its history as a working democracy isn't very impressive. In some regions it has practically no democratic track record before 1989. If Germany falls back into dictatorship tomorrow, everyone will suddenly remember this.
I think any comparison of the Middle East and the non-Middle East now that rests on very broad generalizations about the far past (Arab armies, Caliphates) can go wrong very easily. It won't help people in Yemen deal with their democratic deficit.
Same goes for other big generalizations that purport to explain, e.g. recent economic success in East Asia. It's easy enough to get whatever answer you want.
OK, Western powers had an upswing in their ability to intervene elsewhere post 1800. As you say, sometimes they used that power to derail movements towards democracy. Sometimes they left behind democratic institutions that survive today. Sometimes they left behind democratic institutions that jumped the rails without outside assistance. Sometimes they backed the less authoritarian side with good results. I'm not seeing a clearly anti-democratic pattern in the post 1800 Western interventions, especially compare to the small number of places where intervention failed.
" especially compare to the small number of places where intervention failed."
I have read that clause several times but I still don't understand it.
I'm thinking of places like Thailand, which was not colonized, and places like Ethiopia, Afghanistan and Turkey, where foreign occupation was relatively brief and did not permanently reshape local governance.
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